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In 2010, there were 56 Indian firms in the Fortune Global 1000. These included firms like Sun 
Pharmaceutical with revenues of slightly less than US$ 1 billion, to Infosys and TCS with market 
values of roughly US$ 30 billion, and Indian Oil with revenues of about US$ 50 billion,.1 Most of these 
firms now have operations overseas. Some, such as the Tata Group, have more than 57% of their 
revenues coming from abroad. In this chapter, we examine the links between Indian firms’ 
internationalization and their innovation capabilities over the last two decades. We also discuss the 
implications of these recent trends for developments in Indian firms’ innovation and 
internationalization in the future.  
The innovation and internationalization process of Indian firms has been dynamic, with  both 
elements changing qualitatively and quantitatively over the last two decades. We identify three 
broad phases in this process: an initial phase (which roughly covers the 1990s) and two subsequent 
phases (which together roughly cover the 2000s). These phases correspond to the changing 
institutional landscape in India (and overseas). For instance, in India, the 1990s were a period of 
opening up of the economy following several decades of import substitution and tight internal 
controls. Thus, Indian firms in the 1990s were still constrained in what they could do internally but 
were even more constrained in terms of what they could outside the country.  
We structure our discussion of these three phases around the following questions: 
1. What were the innovation capabilities of Indian MNEs in each of these phases?  
2. How did Indian firms use these innovation capabilities to internationalize, both to other 
emerging markets as well as to developed markets? 
We then answer the following questions: 
3. What is the applicability of the model that comes out of the analysis of the two questions 
above, both with respect to firms going from Emerging Markets (EMs) to Emerging Markets 
as well as firms going from Emerging Markets to Developed Markets (DMs)?  
4. What conclusions can be drawn about the competitive advantage of Indian MNEs arising 
from innovation? 
5. What will the still-evolving third phase of innovation and internationalization look like for 
Indian MNEs in the years to come? 
                                                          
1
Source : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_companies_of_India 
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INNOVATION AND INTERNATIONALIZATION BY INDIAN FIRMS: THE EVOLUTIONARY 
PATH SINCE  1990. 
 
Innovation by Indian firms has been driven and determined by a mix of institutional, industry 
and firm-level factors. As the economic and institutional environment has evolved, the competitive 
dynamics across a range of industries have changed. Specifically, the emphasis that firms have 
placed on innovation versus internationalization, and the nature of the relationship between the 
two, has changed over time. While there have been distinct cases of companies using India-specific 
factors to compete in international markets, such as the well-known and widely recognized success 
of Indian IT and BPO firms, there have been an equal number of cases driven by other types of 
relationships between innovation and internationalization which we outline below.  
To structure our analysis, we look at three distinct though overlapping phases of innovation 
and internationalization of Indian firms. 
Phase One (1990-2000): Arbitrage-based Internationalization 
The first phase of Indian internationalization, roughly corresponding to the 1990s, marks a 
starting point in terms of the development of the innovation capabilities of Indian MNEs. The overall 
thrust of such innovation involved the arbitrage of a low-cost base in India. The penetration of 
international markets was based on trading of entrepreneurial skills. Such internationalization was 
largely focused on markets that at the time were categorized as transitional or developing – such as 
the ex-Soviet bloc, Africa and South East Asia. To gain a better understanding of why this was the 
preferred method of internationalization, we examine the context, both in India and overseas, and 
the type of firm-level innovation that leveraged this context. 
The Indian context, in the 1990s, consisted of groups of largely oligopolistic firms, 
particularly family-owned business groups, across a range of industries. Such an outcome was due to 
a specific approach to a managed market economy that the Indian government had pursued for the 
preceding decades. Specifically: the government allocated licenses to firms to undertake a specific 
industrial activity, and the focus of government policy was a) import substitution across a range of 
products, such as consumer goods and medicines and b) to manage ‘destructive’ competitive forces 
(Luce, 2008).  
At the same time, a large number of industry sectors had also been ‘reserved’ for small and 
medium sized enterprises – this was termed as the ‘license raj’, wherein the state was involved in 
micro-managing the management decisions of private firms (Das, 2002; Luce, 2008). The 1990s 
marked a period when new institutional arrangements were being devised and slowly implemented. 
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Regulatory barriers were removed across a range of industries, so that new, and sometimes foreign, 
competition could enter. For example, beverage giants Pepsi and Coke entered the Indian market in 
this period, after a gap of nearly two decades, while some automakers such as Ford also made 
limited entry with a few models. At the same time nevertheless, old institutional practices, built over 
decades of the license raj, were still intact in many aspects, such as foreign exchange and foreign 
ownership restrictions. The transition provided particular challenges for many firms, as they needed 
to make sense of and respond to changing institutional and industry conditions in terms of the 
direction and magnitude of such changes.  
As the economy liberalized in the 1990s, and as new institutional conditions evolved, some 
firms, particularly the more entrepreneurial ones, tended to aggressively initiate international 
expansion. Many of these were from emerging industries such as information technology. Such an 
approach used a combination of factor-based arbitrage and entrepreneurship that matched supply 
in India with demand in overseas markets.  
The demand from overseas markets came from changes that had occurred there in the 
1990s. New markets emerged following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, 
as well as from growth in Africa. Institutional infrastructure in many of these countries was just 
beginning to be established, and industry conditions were also being opened up to new competition. 
In other words, there were similarities between conditions in the Indian context and some of these 
overseas markets, in terms of the direction of change in institutional and industry conditions. 
The theoretical explanation for this pattern of innovation and internationalization lies in 
institutional theory which suggests that the firm’s ability to exploit or improve its capabilities abroad 
may vary, depending upon the institutional contexts in which it invests. Kostova (1996) was one of 
the early researchers to recognise these challenges and termed the construct ‘institutional distance’ 
to tap into the extent of similarity or dissimilarity between the regulatory, cognitive, and normative 
institutions of countries. The institutional environment, in particular, affects various aspects of firms’ 
operations and thus its competitive advantage in the host country. Regulatory, normative and 
cognitive factors can affect various aspects of firms’ activities and ways of competing in the host 
country (Xu and Shenkar, 2003).  
Emerging countries are characterized by a lack of the soft infrastructure that makes markets 
work efficiently (Khanna and Palepu, 2006: 62). This infrastructure includes intermediaries such as 
market researchers, supply chain partners, rating agencies and media, regulatory systems and 
contract enforcing mechanisms. Thus emerging countries are characterized by ‘institutional voids’ 
that make it difficult for companies to access capital or talent, to invest in R&D or build global 
brands. Emerging country firms or local firms can exploit these voids to compete with MNEs from 
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developed countries that lack experience of operating in these institutional settings (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2006). 
Thus emerging market firms that have learned to compete in institutional environments 
characterized by weak institutions and institutional voids may be better positioned to compete in 
other emerging markets with similar environments. This logic underlies the concept of institutional 
arbitrage. Hall and Soskice (2001) define institutional arbitrage as follows: ‘multinational enterprises 
may shift particular activities to other nations in order to secure the advantages that the institutional 
frameworks of their political economies offer for pursuing those activities’ (2001:57). Thus gaps in 
the host institutional environment or an unfavourable institutional environment may be offset by 
taking advantage of institutional arbitrage. In summary, institutional theory concepts suggest that 
emerging market firms may benefit from engaging in institutional arbitrage in other emerging 
markets (Figure 1). 
In addition, industry conditions in many of the still ‘emerging’ and mostly ‘transitional’ 
markets were also evolving in the 1990s. In many emerging markets, industry structures were less 
well developed and less competitive than in developed markets. For instance, supplier networks and 
related industry infrastructure were less well-developed. Product innovation was less aggressively 
practiced, and incumbents tended to coexist in terms of sharing the overall market. At the extreme, 
entire industries or important segments of industries were undeveloped. In other cases, industries 
had homogenous product offerings, with little segmentation or differentiation to address the unique 
demands of customer sub-segments. 
In such a context, firms from other emerging markets that have relatively advanced 
domestic markets in terms of product innovation and competitive intensity were likely to find such 
underdeveloped markets and industries attractive for entry. These firms could bring assets that they 
have developed in their domestic markets, and that had value, i.e. fit, in specific emerging or 
developing economies. These assets and capabilities could be unique, in the sense that Western 
competitors may not have the same accumulated set of relevant capabilities. Thus, penetration of 
particular segments was potentially easier. Figure 1 reflects this idea that emerging market firms 
may find attractive opportunities under specific institutional and industry conditions. 
For Indian firms, relative success in addressing such new demands in the 1990s was to a 
large extent based on their use and leveraging of various kinds of innovation. Some of these were 
product-based, mostly in low-end consumer goods, garments, and medicines, namely the four T’s: 
tea, toothpaste, t-shirts, and tablets.  A major rationale for such innovations were those based on 
exploiting factor differentials, in terms of both cost and quality, between India and the host markets. 
Other types of product based innovations were also seen on a limited scale. For instance, 
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automobiles and trucks were exported to other developing markets, particularly those in Africa that 
had similar infrastructure conditions as in India. They also had similar institutional conditions, 
particularly in the rigour of product certification and quality expectations, as well as price points that 
the local host market could afford. In these conditions, while there was some latent demand, the 
Indian firms had the appropriate product portfolio at the price points that would open up the market 
for them. Similarly, Indian firms, specifically trading houses, were major providers of certain basic 
consumer goods to the Russian market, in the post-communist 1990s. Institutional conditions for 
many of these consumer goods were still being formed, in terms of product certification, while 
industry conditions meant that many such products were suddenly unavailable as supply chains 
collapsed together with purchasing power. Indian firms then moved to provide such basic consumer 
goods at prices that were attractive to a population that suffered a rapid loss of purchasing power, 
following the collapse of the Soviet system. 
A second type of innovation, once again based on factor differentials, also emerged in this 
period of the 1990s. These were essentially processes that were done at a lower cost and sometimes 
higher productivity than in overseas markets. Such process innovations primarily enabled the 
Information Technology sector to develop and thrive, and also involved the trend of ‘body-shopping’ 
that arbitraged low-cost based skills between home and host markets. The market focus of such 
innovating firms, however, was different from the product-based types – the primary focus here was 
the developed markets rather than other ‘developing’ or ‘emerging’ or ‘transitional’ markets.  
A final type of innovation that emerged in this period was innovation in business models. 
Firms were able to develop unique value propositions based on distinctive value chains, both inside 
and outside the firm. An interesting case is that of the diamond industry globally. Typically centred in 
the Belgian port city of Antwerp, the industry became increasingly dominated by the Indian diaspora 
from the 1990s. These Indian firms, typically family owned and managed, provided a unique 
business model of intermediary services between diamond supply and demand. Sourcing rough 
diamonds from Botswana, and from Southern Africa, they moved these diamonds to the Western 
Indian city of Surat, and then used highly skilled and low cost artisans to polish and sell the finished 
product to global buyers. In other words, the business model was based on providing a unique link 
between different value chain players in Africa, India, and Belgium. 
This initial first phase of internationalization and innovation was thus characterized by some 
common elements: innovation based on labour or factor arbitrage, entrepreneurial skills that drove 
the ambition to enter and succeed in international markets, a focus on developing or emerging or 
transition economies (with the exception of IT firms that primarily focused on developed market 
clients), and also arbitraging to a limited extent on institutional and industry conditions. However, 
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there were still a range of restrictions imposed by regulation and the firm-level capabilities. For 
example, restrictions on foreign exchange and hence overseas investments were still prevalent, 
along with redundant inefficiencies built up during the decades of the license raj. These barriers 
made market-seeking innovations relatively few, and with even more limited cases of success in 
international markets. In the second phase, however, innovation picked up, and the further opening 
up and liberalization of the Indian economy meant that internationalization had a different 
character. We elaborate on this below. 
Phase Two (2000 to 2005): Innovation for the Indian Market 
The second phase of our analysis broadly corresponds to the years 2000 to 2005. In the first 
phase, Indian firms were still emerging out of a protected environment and the sense of entitlement 
that entry barriers created by regulation confers. However, through the 1990s, as the Indian 
economy liberalized and a different set of institutional conditions set in, Indian firms developed 
towards operating in more competitive conditions. In 2000-2005 then, innovation trajectories and 
firms’ focus shifted from the transient advantages afforded by labour and cost arbitrage as both the 
environments and firms’ strategies changed.  
While there were some uncertainties in Phase One on whether the opening up of the Indian 
economy was going to be transient, during Phase Two it became increasingly clear that the 
liberalization process was largely irreversible. The philosophy of the Indian state in managing the 
Indian economy had clearly changed from active participation to  providing the context within which 
private firms could grow and prosper. Further, many restrictions, such as those on capital and 
foreign exchange transactions, were relaxed, as the Indian economy gradually became more 
integrated with the global economy. Hence, M&A emerged as a viable strategy for Indian firms 
looking to gain globally competitive innovative capabilities.  
Competitive conditions too became more intense across a range of industries, as more were 
opened up to both domestic and foreign competition. Many Indian firms radically restructured in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, as they shed peripheral businesses and increased focus (Luce, 2008). 
While in the past, the philosophy of many Indian firms, and business groups in particular, was that 
‘we can do anything and everything’, the philosophy in the 2000s became more focussed within 
sometimes related fields (for instance, oil, gas & refining  for the Reliance group, or the industry 
sector approach of the Birla group).  
As Indian companies became more efficient and as new firms entered, the Indian economy 
as a whole started to pick up speed. Economic growth in the 2000s put India on the world map, and 
made it one of the more attractive emerging markets, along with the other BRICs. This offered 
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opportunities not only for foreign firms, but also for local firms to enter new segments of the Indian 
market, and develop new ways of competing. That is, the domestic market became a primary target, 
but competition from local and overseas firms meant that Indian firms had to learn new ways of 
competing. 
A combination of competitive pressure and market opportunity motivated some Indian firms 
to move up the innovation value chain and gain more access to resources and markets. This in turn 
pushed many firms to seek new ways of competing from those that were solely based on labour or 
cost arbitrage (as in Phase One). Indian firms now had more confidence in their ability to compete 
not only with domestic competitors, but also increasingly with multinational firms. All this in turn 
had implications for how they chose to do innovation whether with products, processes or business 
models. 
In terms of product innovation, firms in the pharmaceutical industry began to go beyond 
generic drugs based on a low-cost advantage, towards developing new molecular entities in biotech 
including biosimilars. Such moves involved more research intensive activities, instead of primarily 
manufacturing activities. For instance, market leader Biocon increasingly invested in R&D to move to 
a more innovation based model, and also extended into partnerships with Western players such as 
Pfizer for insulin biosimilars (Enright & Subramanian, 2008). This was a process that was begun in the 
early 2000s, following India’s signing up to the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights) regime on intellectual property rights,2 when many pharmaceutical firms in India initiated 
forays into innovation as a way to reduce dependence on an imitation based model practiced for the 
previous two decades. In general, while in the 1990s, a majority of the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry was focused on bulk drugs, the early 2000s saw an increased focus on prescription drugs for 
the domestic market. Prescription drugs commanded higher margins, but required increased 
investment in R&D, as well as marketing and distribution. Overall, while the R&D investments in the 
pharmaceutical industry in the1980s and 1990s were done with public funds, the 2000s increasingly 
saw investments by private firms (Saranga and Banker, 2009).  
In terms of process innovation, it is instructive to see how the information technology firms 
evolved in Phase Two. Indian IT firms tried to integrate vertically by seeking industry-specific 
knowledge, such as banking or insurance, and developing some consulting expertise to go along with 
their back-end IT services. The IT firms’ major customers were in the developed markets of North 
America, Europe and Japan. However, these firms were not always successful as they ended up 
competing with IT majors such as Accenture or IBM, amongst others. The foreign MNEs had 
                                                          
2
 The Indian Patent Act, 1999, was an effort to make the previous legislation, the Indian Patent Act, 1970, 
TRIPS complaint. TRIPS was established in 1994, and later became part of the WTO accession agreement. 
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developed client relationships, a key entry barrier, and were also increasingly moving their back-
office services to India. While competition was one factor, many firms in the IT industry, used to 
rapid growth in their traditional service offerings, had little motivation, and hence had some inertia 
in shifting their focus from one based on labour-cost arbitrage to one based on knowledge.  
The more interesting evolution was the increasing focus on business model innovation, 
particularly in services. Consider the case of Bharti – a leading telecom player in India. It had 
developed a specific model for providing mobile phone services in India. It had focussed its activities 
on marketing, brand building, pricing and billing instead of the actual provision of the technology. By 
outsourcing many of the technology related activities such as developing and managing network 
equipment as well as some of the back-office IT activities such as customer data, it was able to 
reduce capital expenditures. This enabled the firm to focus on the customer side, and offer some of 
the lowest prices globally to customers, thus driving rapid market growth. In fact, together with 
other leading players such as Reliance Telecom, Bharti was able to bring mobile phone access to the 
vast interiors of India, where having a telephone had been a luxury in the past. To a large extent, this 
was made possible by value propositions that were oriented towards price points that combined low 
call rates with low-cost phones that made mobile telephony affordable to a large number of rural 
customers. 
As the Indian economy gathered pace, many Western multinationals that were still holding 
back in the 1990s entered the Indian market with significant commitments. To be able to compete in 
this qualitatively different environment (compared to Phase One), some Indian firms felt the need to 
focus their resources on succeeding in the domestic market. The emphasis was now increasingly on 
innovation, but many firms lacked capabilities, particularly in technology. Selective acquisitions by 
companies primarily in engineering, such as by the wind-power company Suzlon and moulding 
company Bharat Forge, often played the role of enhancing the capability profile of the Indian firms in 
their ability to compete in the domestic market. Indian firms’ horizons also started expanding 
beyond their domestic markets, and domestic strategies became increasingly integrated with these 
firms’ global strategies. 
There were some limited efforts to internationalize home-grown innovations in Phase Two. 
Some firms tried out international entry on a relatively small scale. For example, Mahindra & 
Mahindra’s launched their off-road vehicles in some African countries, while Tata Motors’ began to 
sell their trucks in some African and South American countries. However, these efforts were limited, 
and were largely driven by the forces of competition in domestic markets. Internationalization and 
innovation in Phase Two had a qualitatively different character to Phase One; these became more 
asset- and capability-seeking rather than market seeking in Phase Two. This was because the focus 
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was increasingly on the rapidly growing domestic market, and assets were being built up to drive 
innovation to compete in the domestic market primarily. 
Overall, from a focus on cost based arbitrage advantages in the Phase One, the focus in 
Phase Two shifted increasingly towards competing on innovation capabilities. Such a shift involved 
different skills sets and knowledge bases than those involved in Phase One.  
Phase Three (2005 to 2010): Leveraging Innovation into International Markets 
While Phase Two saw an emphasis on innovation as a way of gaining competitive advantage, 
particularly in the domestic market, Phase Three saw a greater focus on internationalization as well 
– particularly the search for new markets. During much of the first decade of the 2000s, 
institutionally, many of the developing or transitional economies such as China, Russia, Brazil, and 
Africa made moves towards improving investment conditions, and establishing new legal and 
institutional conditions. While their application and rigour were not always uniform, the opening of 
these markets, particularly large markets like China and Russia, offered great opportunities for 
multinationals, both from developed and emerging markets. While large and medium sized 
developing and emerging countries moved to a new market philosophy and industrial structure, 
many industries were still opening up or emerging, especially in services and healthcare. At the same 
time, institutional environments too were still evolving, and were similar to conditions in India. For 
instance, anti-trust and foreign exchange regulations were still being put in place in countries such as 
Russia and China, as these countries addressed issues of macroeconomic policy along with currency 
regimes and privatization policies (Goldman, 2003). 
In terms of product innovation, in industries such as automobiles, local players like  Tata 
Motors and Mahindra & Mahindra, after launching successful products in the Indian market, moved 
more aggressively into markets in Africa, South America, China and even the US. Their products 
included trucks from Tata to off-road vehicles and farm vehicles from Mahindra & Mahindra. These 
were based on their established success in the domestic market being exported to overseas markets 
where industry and institutional conditions allowed for market penetration.  
In terms of process innovations, pharmaceutical firms increasingly targeted their biosimilars 
to overseas markets. In addition many IT firms morphed into business process outsourcing firms, as 
they took on ever more types of processes for their overseas clients. 
But the more interesting and probably profound development in innovation for international 
markets came in the form of applying unique business models that were first developed for the 
Indian market, and then subsequently adapted for the overseas market. Many of these were 
interestingly in services rather than products, the latter being typically considered to be the strength 
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of firms from emerging markets such as China and based on low cost arbitrage. In contrast, service 
based internationalization was based on innovation, and particularly innovation in business models. 
Take again the case of Bharti Airtel. In the second half of the 2000s, the company started 
internationalizing into neighbouring markets like Bangladesh where it invested US$ 500 million. 
Bharti later bought the African assets of Zain Communications, a Kuwait based telecom firm in 2010. 
In effect, what Bharti was trying to do was to apply its business model (i.e., its price focused, 
outsourcing of capital-intensive parts of the activity chain and system) to markets that it believed it 
could compete in – where there were some industry and institutional conditions that were still 
evolving. Similarly, after having gained a reputation for quality at low cost in medical services, Indian 
healthcare providers started expanding their scale-driven business model into some South-East 
Asian countries, such as Thailand, Vietnam and even Singapore. For example, Fortis Healthcare, a 
major Indian healthcare provider, expanded its footprint by buying into the assets of a cancer 
hospital in Singapore, with the objective of implementing the scale-sensitive business model that it 
had developed in Indian conditions, as well as gaining new capabilities from the advanced medical 
infrastructure in Singapore.3  
In other industries, such as diamonds, the Indian entrepreneurs who had increasingly 
dominated cutting and trading, moved up the value chain and started offering a wider range of 
services such as financing and end-to-end logistics, thus adopting a one-stop business model for 
their buyers. In the highly visible IT industry, the model moved towards what was called a ‘global 
delivery model’ where clients’ needs were served with a combination of assets on site at the client’s 
location, in addition to the Indian company’s assets and capabilities in India, and sometimes in other 
parts of the world (such as China). In other words, in a number of industries, what was increasingly 
becoming innovative was not the product or the process, but the business model itself that was 
often rolled out in India, scaled, and then applied to particular overseas markets that had the right 
industry and institutional conditions needed. 
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS, LIMITS AND CHALLENGES 
We see that Indian firms’ use of innovation capabilities to successfully internationalize 
rested on two main choices. First, the choice of location (Emerging Market or Developed Market, 
and then which country in particular) and second the adaptation or adoption of existing or new 
business models. Successful Indian MNEs were able to find a fit between the home country (India) 
and host country institutional and industry conditions. They were able to leverage their internally 
                                                          
3
 See http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/qa-malvinder-mohan-singh-fortis-healthcare/426504/ 
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developed innovative capabilities to fit these markets. (e.g., Indian pharmaceutical firms in Russia in 
the 1990s; IT firms into developed markets).   
The institution-based view argues that firms develop resources to respond and compete in 
their home environments, including their institutional conditions (Peng et al., 2009). Emerging 
market firms faced with institutional voids end up developing ‘specific’ resources and capabilities to 
compete in such environments. These institutionally adapted resources and developed capabilities 
including innovation capabilities then drive the firm’s strategies at home and abroad (Cuervo-
Cazurra, Meyer and Ramamurti, 2011). Similarly, industry conditions too drive firms to develop 
resources and create strategies that help them serve customer needs and interact with competitors 
and counter the strategies of competitors within the norms and regulations of the institutional 
environment.   
Thus Indian MNEs who first entered other emerging markets and less developed markets 
benefitted from the resources, capabilities and strategies developed in India. They were at a 
competitive advantage over firms from developed markets that did not have the experience of 
developing complementary or primary resources in their home countries to counter institutional and 
industry voids. Further, Indian MNEs were at a slightly advanced stage of development compared 
with firms from some emerging markets like Russia and others in specific industries. Emerging 
market MNEs can save on the learning cost of developing resources because they already have such 
experience at home, and may even be able to transfer some of the resources already developed to 
the new host country. Creative application of prior strategies that worked in their home markets 
may also allow these emerging market firms to identify unique segments of demand within an 
already functioning industry or an entirely new industry category altogether.  
The second and particularly the third phase of internationalization coincided with 
developments in both the institutional and industry environment in India. Pro-market reforms 
reduced institutional voids with the liberalization of markets and improvements in governance 
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009).The opening up of the Indian economy both forced and enabled 
Indian firms to become more competitive by being able to access more capital, invest in new 
resources and upgrade existing resources through greater investments in research and 
development, training and assets. Thus, Indian MNEs developed greater capabilities leading to 
higher levels of innovation. Further, Indian firms were also forced to go overseas in search of 
technology and learning to compete both with Indian firms at home and MNEs in their home 
markets. This springboard (Luo and Tung, 2007) action further developed their innovation 
capabilities. As they moved up the value chain, Indian firms were better positioned to compete not 
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only in emerging markets that had developed further, but also in key industries in developed 
markets.  
Despite these successes, Indian MNEs still had some limitations however. In some developed 
markets, Indian firms lacked competitiveness or faced tougher institutional environments than at 
home and were thus unable to compete (for example, the pharmaceutical industry’s expansion in 
the US has not been as successful as those into emerging markets, where Indian firms have often run 
into trouble with regulatory bodies such as the US Food and Drug Administration). There were also 
challenges in specific industries in specific emerging markets. For example, Indian pharmaceutical 
firms faced tough competition from Western firms and regulations favouring local Chinese 
companies in China. Several Indian firms that had entered China in the early 2000s were forced to 
scale back efforts in 2009-2011.  
CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND THE WAY AHEAD 
Innovation and internationalization by Indian firms has changed significantly over the last 
two decades. In this time, continued development in India has removed some institutional voids, 
though not all. Further, Indian MNEs have evolved and are no longer solely reliant on their domestic 
markets. Some, such as the Tata group, now generate more revenue from overseas markets than 
from their home market. This also applies to several pharmaceutical firms. Such firms increasingly 
resemble international players, competing in India and abroad. As the competitive and institutional 
context, both in India and outside, has changed, firms have adjusted their strategies to compete in 
newer ways. 
Indian firms’ strategies on innovation and internationalization have become increasingly 
complex and increasingly involve a mix of asset-seeking and market-seeking rationales. Several 
leading Indian firms are now listed overseas and are able to access international capital. They have 
established research and development centres of excellence in developed markets. Learning from 
these experiences (both successful and unsuccessful), Indian firms are now engaging in higher 
technology innovation both in India and overseas with a view to  targeting the high end of developed 
markets. For example, Suzlon, the Indian alternative energy firm, started off in 1995 with basic 
technology to counter soaring power costs and the infrequent availability of power in the Indian 
state of Gujarat. It is now the world’s third largest wind power equipment manufacturer. It has R&D 
centres in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, India and the Netherlands, and manufacturing facilities on 
three continents. India is now also a hub for small cars, and Chennai is referred to as the Detroit of 
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South Asia4. Pharmaceutical firms such as Dr. Reddy’s and Ranbaxy have led the way in drug 
discovery and acquiring patents in the US. India is also increasingly a global hub for drug research 
and development and for clinical trials5. Further, Indian firms are using innovation capabilities to 
invest in other emerging markets to both develop these markets as well as to  expand the scale and 
scope of their operations. For example, Infosys and Wipro have established software development 
centres in Shanghai and Chengdu, China, while Aurobindo Pharmaceutical has set up production and 
manufacturing facilities in Datun, China.  
The typical process followed by these firms, particularly those that focus on business model 
innovation, was to first develop and fine-tune the innovation in India and then adapt it to specific 
industry and institutional conditions overseas. While still in the early stages, such approaches have 
made it possible for domestic and international strategies to become more integrated. As the Indian 
economy continues to integrate with the global economy, not only in terms of products and 
markets, but also institutionally, this trend is likely to increase. Given India’s recent emergence as a 
global player, Indian firms may begin to focus on identified areas of excellence and continue to build 
capabilities here instead of spreading into other sectors. Indian firms may also begin to add 
manufacturing innovation instead of services innovation to complete the value chain of activities in 
these key industries. 
However, global expansion also comes with pitfalls – accessing international capital may 
reduce the cost of capital but exposes firms to international regulatory pressures and more rigorous 
standards of corporate governance. Indian firms’ ability to manage across borders is still nascent 
when compared with that of Western multinationals – specifically, in attracting and motivating 
foreign talent, understanding overseas cultures, customers and competitive conditions, and 
adjusting levels of integration and responsiveness dynamically across time, geographies, products 
and activities. It is also unclear how some of the recent large scale acquisitions will perform: how will 
Bharti fare in Africa, and how successful will the Jaguar and Land Rover acquisitions prove to be for 
Tata over time? Either way, the next few years promise to be significant ones in the development of 
Indian firms’ internationalization and innovation efforts. 
                                                          
4
 Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2010. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704111704575354853980451636.html.  
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Key points for three phases of Innovation in Indian firms.  
  
 First Phase: 1990s 
 
Second Phase: First half of first decade of 2000s 
 
Third Phase: Second half of first decade 
of 2000s 
Overall Low cost, trade entrepreneurial skill as innovation, 
to other EMs (e.g., Soviet bloc, Africa, SE e.g., Birla 
to Thailand and Malaysia; Mittal to Kazakhstan and 
Indonesia) 
Moving up the innovation value chain, primarily 
focusing on the Indian market, selective 
internationalization – both market seeking and 
asset seeking to be better able to compete 
domestically 
 
Leveraging business model innovation 
from India to other EMs (china, Africa, 
Eastern Europe, Latin America) but also 
to some DMs both to leverage existing 
innovation capabilities but also to 
acquire these capabilities 





Expertise from 5 decades of import substitution in 
low cost high volume (e.g., generics and auto but 
also consumer goods); Low cost, mostly using 
labour or some other kind of arbitrage; 
entrepreneurial skill: lots of small and medium size 
firms, but mostly trade; innovation was mostly 
about matching supply and demand 
Institutional development; Acceleration of 
opening of the Indian economy; macroeconomic 
growth; new firms entering old and new 
industries; increased and substantial foreign 
competition; relaxation on JV investments; 
relaxation of capital and foreign exchange 
controls 
Increasing local and foreign 
competition; experience in competing 
with innovation; more institutional 
evolution, more access to capital; 
accelerating macroeconomic growth; 




Institutional conditions and cultural issues, how 
governments operated; Industry immaturity: some 
market opportunities (e.g., Soviet bloc countries, 
Africa) ; similarity in markets (low incomes) and 
supply and related infrastructure 
Opening up of new markets; institutional 
development; access to domestic markets and 
assets by foreign firms 
 
Liberalization in many markets; 
Economic crisis; Protectionism in some 
markets; Institutional evolution, 









Generics; Low-end consumer goods: 4Ts 
namely tea, toothpaste, T-shirts and 
tablets, Autos etc. 
 
From generics to biomsimilars; 
autos/vehicles for Indian market; 
services (healthcare, banking, etc)  for 
Indian market 
Mahindra & Mahindra tractors in 
Africa; Tata trucks in Africa/South 
America 
 
From generic drugs to new molecular entities to 
biotech including biosimilars(e.g., Biocon has a 
licensing deal with Pfizer to do insulin biosimilars; 
statins) 
Mahindra and Mahindra tractors in China, Africa, US; 
Tata trucks into more Ems 
Process 
Innovation 
Business process outsourcing, 
bodyshopping,  IT 
 
IT firms taking more activities; 
Innovating in biotechnology (drug 
discovery – biosimilars) 
IT firms going into verticals, consulting, global 
delivery models, cross-country product development 




Diamond industry: getting rough 
diamonds from Botswana, SA and 
Australia to Surat and then using highly 
skilled and low cost artisans to polish and 
then sell to global buyers: Africa, India, 
Belgium 
 
Telecoms (BhartiAirtel); Healthcare, 
Autos, banking – reconfiguring the 
activity chain and system; cost 
innovation and market generating 
prices, primarily focused on domestic 
markets 
For services not just products - e.g., mobile telephony 
Bharti going to Africa; healthcare going to 
Thailand/SE Asia; diamond industry moving to high 
value added e.g., to higher value diamonds, bigger 
diamond pieces plus services such as financing with 
one stop shop etc. 
